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The human consequences of the current global financial 
crisis for the developing world are presumed to be 
severe yet few studies have quantified such impact. The 
authors estimate the additional number of infant deaths 
in sub-Saharan Africa likely due to the crisis and discuss 
possible mitigation strategies. They pool birth-level data 
as reported in female adult retrospective birth histories 
from all Demographic and Health Surveys collected in 
sub-Saharan Africa nations. This results in a data set of 
639,000 births to 264,000 women in 30 countries. The 
authors use regression models with flexible controls for 
temporal trends to assess an infant’s likelihood of death 
as a function of fluctuations in national income. They 
This paper—a product of the Poverty and Inequality Team and Human Development and Public Services Team, Development 
Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to explore the economic and human consequences of economic 
crises. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at jfriedman@worldbank.org.  
then apply this estimated likelihood to expected growth 
shortfalls as a result of the crisis. At current growth 
projections, their estimates suggest there will be 30,000–
50,000 excess infant deaths in sub-Saharan Africa. Most 
of these additional deaths are likely to be poorer children 
(born to women in rural areas and lower education levels) 
and are overwhelmingly female. If the crisis continues 
to worsen the number of deaths may grow much larger, 
especially those to girls. Policies that protect the income 
of poor households and that maintain critical health 
services during times of economic contraction should be 
considered. Interventions targeted at female infants and 
young girls may be particularly beneficial. 
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1.  Introduction 
The US subprime crisis, and the likelihood that the attendant downturn will spread from 
developed to developing countries has left policy-makers and academics concerned about the 
“human” costs of the crisis for poor countries. These human costs could in principle take a variety 
of forms—lower income and consumption levels, higher unemployment, lower investments in 
education by families, and worse health and nutrition outcomes. Of particular concern are 
changes that could have irreversible consequences for the wellbeing of children throughout their 
lives—for example, school dropout or impaired child development at critical, early ages. No 
outcome is more dramatic than infant death, and in no region is infant mortality higher than in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth Africa, for short).
1 In this note we assess the likely impact of the 
current financial crisis on infant mortality in Africa. To do this, we first use data from all 
available Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for the region to construct retrospective birth 
and death histories, and assess the impact of past crises on infant mortality in Africa. We then use 
the most recent (April 2009) IMF growth projections to estimate the likely impact of the current 
downturn on infant mortality.  
  The basic messages of our analysis are two. First, although severe, the consequences of 
the current economic crisis for infant mortality in Africa are likely to be much smaller than many 
of the estimates that have been frequently cited on blogs or in the popular press.
2 Specifically, our 
estimates suggest approximately 30,000 to 50,000 excess infant deaths in Africa in 2009. Second, 
however, we find that virtually all of these excess deaths take place to girls, not boys. 
Furthermore, these asymmetries in the impact of the crisis by gender are particularly apparent for 
sharp (rather than modest) contractions in per capita GDP—a finding that is important if the 
current growth projections were to be revised further downward. 
  
2.  Data and methods 
The DHS ask women a set of questions about the date of birth, current vital statistics, and 
date of death (if deceased) of all children ever born. We use the responses to these questions to 
construct retrospective birth and death histories for every woman in the surveys. Our measure of 
infant mortality is an indicator that takes on the value of one if a child died at a reported age of 12 
                                                 
1 In 2005, the IMR per 1,000 children born was 90.8 in Sub Saharan Africa. As a comparison, in this same 
year the rate was 24.2 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 62.2 in South Asia (57.7 in India), and 24.8 in 
East Asia (21.4 in China).  
2 See http://africacan.worldbank.org/a-sub-prime-crisis-in-the-us-and-infant-deaths-in-africa; Harvey 
Morris, “Forgotten victims of the downturn”, Financial Times March 11, 2009, p. 4; Nicholas Kristof, “At 
Stake Are More Than Banks”, New York Times, April 1, 2009.  3 
 
months or younger.
3 After removing trends from GDP in various ways, we compare the 
probability of infant death in years in which GDP was below trend with other years. This 
approach closely follows Baird Friedman and Schady (2007) (henceforth BFS; see also Paxson 
and Schady 2005 on a crisis in Peru and Bhalotra 2009 on cyclicality in infant mortality in 
India).
4  
Table 1 gives the list of countries (30) and DHS (62) in Africa. These surveys collect 
information on approximately 260,000 women and 640,000 live births, and are the basis for our 
calculations. Yearly GDP per capita numbers are taken from the IMF; for every country, Table 2 
gives the average growth rate between 1993 and 2008, the growth rate in 2008, and the April 
2009 IMF projection of the growth rate for 2009; the last column, finally, gives the “growth 
shortfall”—the difference between the 2008 growth rate and the 2009 projected growth rate.
5 This 
difference is a (simple) measure of how much lower growth rates in 2009 are expected to be than 
they would have been in the absence of the financial crisis, and are important for our calculations 
of “excess deaths”. We discuss this in more detail below.  
The basic approach we take involves pooling data from all of the surveys and running 
regressions of the following form: 
imct t        ct c c imct logGDP   ) ( f         D         (1)  
                                                 
3 We use this measure of infant mortality, rather than the standard definition of mortality for children 
younger than 12 months, because of age heaping in reports of mortality. Further, we discard information 
for children born within 12 months of the survey when calculating mortality rates to avoid complications 
with censored data. Results are largely unchanged if we restrict our mortality measure to those infants who 
died at an age younger than 12 months. 
4 Although the DHS are a rich source of data, they also have some limitations for our analysis. We briefly 
discuss two of these limitations, both of which are related to the use of retrospective information in the 
DHS to construct birth and death histories. First, recall bias may be a concern if women are less likely to 
accurately remember more distant births and deaths. To minimize recall errors, we do not use information 
on births that occurred more than 11 years prior to the date of the survey. However, our results are robust to 
different cut-offs for the recall period. Second, any given survey is representative of women ages 15-49 at 
the time of the survey, but is not representative of all births and child deaths in earlier years. To see this, 
note that a woman aged 49 in a survey carried out in 2000 would have been 39 in 1990. If no surveys were 
carried out between 1990 and 2000 in this country, no data would be available on births to women aged 40 
or older in 1990. Children born to older women may respond to economic fluctuations differently than 
those born to younger women. To avoid this problem, we discard from the sample births to women age 40 
or older. Our analysis therefore provides meaningful estimates of the relationship between income 
fluctuations and infant mortality for women aged 15 to 39. (We note, however, that a very small fraction, 
less than 3 percent, of births in our sample of DHS countries occur to women age 40 or older.) This 
retrospective construction of births and infant deaths to women aged 15-39 results in series of varying 
lengths and with varying start periods depending on the number and dates of DHS surveys in each country. 
5 For four countries in the table – Djibouti, Eritrea, Lineria, and Zimbabwe – growth information was 
missing for either 2008 or 2009 (or both). In these cases, we replace the missing value with the Africa-wide 
average. These four countries represent 2.9% of the SSA population and 2.5% of births and so any mis-
measurement as a result of these imputations is highly unlikely to bias the aggregate results for the 
continent. 4 
 
where Dimct is an indicator that takes on the value of one if child i born to mother m in country c 
and year t died in her first year of life, zero otherwise; αc is a set of country fixed effects; fc(t) are 
country-specific time trends—in practice, we consider linear, quadratic, and cubic trends. These 
trends are important to ensure that we do not confound the effect of downturns in GDP with long-
term trends in mortality (which may vary by country); logGDPct is the natural logarithm of per 
capita GDP; and εimct is the regression error term. Standard errors are clustered by country which 
corrects for any autocorrelation in shocks to infant mortality across years within country.  
It is also possible to restrict the sample to women who have had more than one child—in 
the African DHS this is approximately 85 percent of women—and include a set of mother fixed 
effects. This compares the probability of death for two children, born to the same woman, in 
different economic times. This specification has the advantage that it controls for all time-
invariant characteristics of mothers. The characteristics of mothers giving birth have been shown 
to vary with economic circumstances in some settings, and it is important to parse out differences 
in mortality to comparable children and families from compositional changes.
6  
The impact of a downturn on mortality may be more or less severe for different kinds of 
children. For example, more educated (and wealthier) mothers may be better able to smooth 
consumption of critical inputs into child health. In practice, because we construct retrospective 
birth and death histories for children born in the past to a given woman, we can only analyze 
heterogeneity in outcomes for mother or household characteristics that are arguably time-
invariant. We focus on two: urban-rural location, and education. This approach implicitly 
assumes that place of residence at the time of the survey is correlated with place of residence at 
the time of reported child birth, and that schooling has been completed by age 15; these should be 
reasonable approximations for most of the countries and years in our sample. (When we restrict 
our sample to women age 18 or older we get very similar results.) We also consider the 
possibility of differential impacts for boys and girls. 
Finally, it is possible that households respond differently to positive and negative shocks 
to GDP. It is also likely that households are better able to protect investments in child health and 
nutrition during relatively modest negative shocks than when these shocks are deep or 
sustained—as would be the case, for example, if credit constraints are important. In terms of 
estimation, this implies that the β coefficient in (1) above will vary with the sign and magnitude 
                                                 
6 For example, Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) find that, among blacks in the United States, the fraction 
of births to high-risk mothers goes up during recessions; while Bhalotra (2009) estimates that higher-risk 
women are more likely to defer fertility in India. On the other hand, BFS and Paxson and Schady (2005) do 
not find important changes in the composition of women giving birth in crisis and non-crisis years. 5 
 
of the shock. There are different ways of exploring heterogeneity of this kind. In practice, we run 
a series of spline regressions. 
The spline regressions we run are motivated by the fact that the one-step specification in 
(1) is very closely related to a two-step approach. This involves first calculating ct D , the average 
mortality rate in country c in year t, then regressing this mean on country fixed effects and a 
flexible, country-specific formulation of time, as before: 
ct ct t D      ) ( f                 (2) c c  
The residual from this regression gives de-trended measures of the infant mortality rate,
*
ct D . 
Similarly, a regression of logGDPct on country fixed effects and a flexible, country-specific 
formulation of time gives de-trended measures of logGDPct. In the second step, 
*
ct D  is regressed 
on detrended logGDPct, with each country-year cell being weighted by the number of live births. 
ct ct    
* *
ct logGDP     D              (3)  
In practice (and as expected) the coefficient β in (3) is very close in value to the coefficient β in 
(1). However, the two-step process lends itself naturally to a spline specification, as follows: 






ct      
Where I(K=1) is an indicator value that takes on the value of one if the de-trended value of 
* logGDPct  is below a given value (the “knot” in the spline).  
We consider spline specifications in which the knot is at zero, -1, and -1.5 standard 
deviations of logGDPct, respectively. (For our sample of African countries, a one standard 
deviation corresponds to a 3.4 percentage point change from trend GDP.) In all of these 
specifications, the impact of a negative shock of a given magnitude is given by the sum of the β1 
and β2 coefficients. For example, when the knot is fixed at zero, β1 gives the change in infant 
mortality for a one-unit, positive deviation in 
* logGDPct from expected trends, while the sum of 
β1 and β2 gives the change in infant mortality for a one-unit, negative deviation in 
* logGDPct.  
 
3.  Results 
 Main  results: The basic set of results for the full sample is reported in Table 3. The first 
row shows that a 1 percent reduction in per capita GDP is associated with an increase in infant 
mortality of between 0.34 per thousand (in the specification that accounts for linear trends) and 
0.62 per thousand (in the specification that accounts for cubic trends). 6 
 
Should we think of these as “large” or “small” effects? We consider two ways of putting 
the magnitude in context. First, the average infant mortality rate for countries and years in our 
sample is 106.7 per 1,000 children born; this implies that a 1 percent change in per capita GDP is 
associated with a 0.32 to 0.58 percent change in mortality, implying an elasticity of mortality with 
respect to GDP of between -0.32 and -0.58. Second, the average annual decline in infant mortality 
for countries and years in our data is 2.56 per thousand. A 1 percent decline in GDP from 
expected trends is therefore associated with an increase in infant mortality that is equivalent to 
between 0.13 (0.34/2.56) and 0.24 (0.62/2.56) of the average annual decline in infant mortality in 
the sample. More meaningfully, perhaps, in countries in which per capita GDP growth was below 
trend, the average deviation from trend was -2.6 percentage points. The average event of below-
trend growth in our data was therefore associated with an increase in mortality of between 0.34 
and 0.62 percent of the average annual decline in IMR. 
  Changes in the composition of women giving birth: The second and third rows of Table 3 
focus on possible changes in the composition of women giving birth. We first re-estimate our 
basic model, but limit the sample to women who have had at least two live births. The 
coefficients on log per capita GDP for this somewhat smaller sample are very similar to those for 
the full sample of women—a little bit larger in the linear specification, and a little bit smaller in 
the quadratic and cubic specifications. In the third row of the table we then present the results 
from regressions that include mother fixed effects. These results are reasonably similar to those in 
the second row, which suggests that changes in the composition of women giving birth explain at 
most a small fraction of the increases in infant mortality we observe during negative shocks to 
GDP in Africa. 
  Heterogeneity by gender, place of residence, education: In Table 4, we consider the 
possibility that shocks to per capita GDP have different effects on the mortality of boys and girls 
(upper panel), on the mortality of children born to women living in urban and in rural areas 
(middle panel), and on the mortality of children born to women with more or less education 
(lower panel). The table suggests that, in Africa, the mortality of girls is substantially more 
sensitive to income shocks than is the mortality of boys: A 1 percent deviation in GDP results in 
approximately 0.33 more boy deaths per thousand, but 0.62 more girl deaths per thousand; note, 
moreover, that the differences in percentage terms are even larger because of the higher average 
mortality of boys than girls—a well-known finding in the demographic literature.
7 The middle 
and lower panels of the table suggest that the mortality of children in rural areas, and of children 
                                                 
7 For example, the World Health Organization (2006) estimates that the male-to-female ratio in neonatal 
mortality and in early neonatal mortality in developing countries is 1.3. 7 
 
born to mothers with lower levels of education is also more sensitive to deviations from GDP 
trend (although base infant mortality rates for women in rural areas and those with less education 
tend to be higher; as a result, the proportional increases in mortality tends to be more closely 
similar to each other).  
  Heterogeneity by size of shock: Table 5 presents the results from a variety of spline 
specifications, as described above, separately for boys (left-hand side of the table) and girls 
(right-hand side). In each case, the right-hand panel, corresponding to positive shocks (or 
negative shocks of smaller magnitude) reports the coefficient β1, while the left-hand panel, 
corresponding to negative shocks of increasingly large magnitude, reports the sum of the β1 and 
β2 coefficients.  
The table makes clear that deep, negative shocks to GDP have particularly dire 
consequences for the infant mortality of girls. Thus, in the specification that fixes the knot at zero, 
a 1 percent negative deviation in GDP results in an increase in infant mortality of 0.25 per 
thousand boys born, but 0.90 per thousand girls born; for negative deviations of 1 standard 
deviations or larger, the comparable coefficients imply increases in mortality of 0.14 per thousand 
for boys, and 1.73 per thousand for girls; finally, for the deepest shocks of 1.5 standard deviations 
or larger, every percentage point reduction in GDP results in an increase in mortality of 0.046 per 
thousand boys born, and 2.14 per thousand girls. All of the coefficients for girls are highly 
significant, but none of those for boys. Thus, a negative shock that would lower the growth rate of 
per capita GDP by 10 percentage points from its underlying (cubic) trend would result in 
approximately 22 more deaths per thousand girls born, but have no impact on boy mortality. Put 
differently, for the largest negative shocks to GDP, the elasticity of infant mortality with respect 
to GDP is -2.1 for girls, but not significantly different from zero for boys.
8 
The very stark differences in the impact of aggregate shocks on the mortality of boys and 
girls are surprising, as Africa is not a region with clear patterns of “son preference” (unlike South 
Asia, for example). One possible explanation is that households protect sons over daughters when 
their incomes fall (even if they do not necessarily do so at other times). An alternative 
explanation is that there is selection in births. In comparison to females, male fetuses have a 
relatively difficult time surviving pregnancy (see Perls and Fretts, 1998; Mizuno, 2000) and this 
difference may be exacerbated during hardship periods. Almond et al. (2007) argue that, during 
the economic chaos associated with the Great Leap Forward in China, the ratio of male to female 
                                                 
8 This finding of differential responses in male and female infant mortality is not limited to the cubic 
functional form. The same patterns are found with a quadratic polynomial in time, or if the relationship 
between infant mortality and GDP is estimated with first differenced data. 8 
 
births fell because of an increase in spontaneous abortions of male fetuses. Given this, the health 
endowment of girls born would on average then be lower than that of boys, and this could result 
in higher mortality of girls after birth. 
To investigate this possibility, we calculated the ratio of male to female births when 
deviations in per capita GDP was negative, and compared it to cases where it was positive; when 
per capita GDP was below -1 standard deviations, and compared it to cases where it was above 
this value; and when per capita GDP was below -1.5 standard deviations, and compared it to 
cases where it was above this value. (In each case, a cubic trend is first removed from GDP, as 
before.) In each of these cases, the ratios of female to male births were very similar, and we can 
never reject the null that they are the same. For example, the ratio of male to female births was 
1.031 when deviations from GDP were negative, and 1.019 when positive. Similarly, the ratio of 
male to female births was 1.022 when deviations from trend GDP were less than -1.5 standard 
deviations, and 1.026 when above. In neither comparison is the difference in the ratios 
statistically significant at conventional levels. By contrast, and consistent with the results we 
present above, the ratio of male to female deaths in the first year is always higher when detrended 
GDP is negative, especially when the negative shocks are large. We conclude that the data are not 
consistent with a selection story along the lines described above. Rather, they are likely to reflect 
differences in behavior towards boys and girls by parents or health providers at times of 
economic distress.  
  Calculation of “excess deaths”: In Table 6, we present some basic calculations of the 
number of excess infant deaths that are likely to take place in Africa in 2009. To do this, we first 
calculate the number of children born in each country (using the total population and crude birth 
rates for 2008 taken from the World Bank DDP database). We then calculate excess deaths 
corresponding to three scenarios. In the first scenario, we compare the April 2009 IMF projected 
growth rates for 2009 with actual growth rates in 2008—see Table 2. The difference between 
these two values then gives the decline in per capita GDP that can plausibly be attributed to the 
global financial crisis. This difference, multiplied by the coefficient in Table 3 (or Table 5, for the 
spline specification), and scaled by the number of children born in a given country, gives a 
country-specific estimate for excess deaths. (In the table, we report the sum for all of Africa.) 
These calculations, summarized in the top row in the table, suggest that, using the most recent 
IMF projections, we could expect there to be somewhere between 28,000 and 49,000 excess 
deaths in Africa in 2009.
9,10 
                                                 
9 All of these calculations make a number of important assumptions. First, that negative shocks to GDP do 
not have an effect on aggregate fertility rates. This is because the number of deaths depends not only on the 9 
 
Suppose, however, that the IMF growth projections were too conservative, so that the 
“true” contractions in GDP were larger. In the middle and bottom row we assume that every 
country in Africa were to have a growth rate that was 6 percent (middle row) or 10 percent 
(bottom row) below trend. Under these much more dire scenarios, excess deaths would be 
approximately 61,000 to 166,000 for the 6 percent reduction, and 101,000 to 322,000 for the 10 
percent reduction—a very large number by almost any measure, but still substantially below 
many of the numbers discussed in the popular press. We note, however, that Table 5 suggests that 
essentially all of these excess deaths would take place to girls, rather than boys. In Africa, there 
appears to be a very important gender dimension to the likely impact of negative shocks to 
aggregate GDP. 
 
4.  Discussion and conclusion  
  Aggregate economic shocks can have serious, deleterious consequences for the wellbeing 
of children. In practice, these consequences depend on the nature and depth of the shock; on the 
extent to which households have access to credit or other mechanisms that allow them to smooth 
out the effects of an income shortfall; on public and other investments in education and health; 
and on the outcome being considered. There may also be important differences in the impact of a 
systemic shock by place of residence, socioeconomic status, and gender. In practice, aggregate 
economic shocks, whether from macroeconomic crises, collapses in the price of key exports, or 
weather shocks, appear to have had negative implications for child health and education in Africa 
(Ferreira and Schady 2009). 
                                                                                                                                                 
mortality rate, but also on the number of children born. However, in regressions of the crude birth rate on 
country-specific intercepts, country-specific time trends and a variable for logGDPct, the coefficient on 
GDP is small and not significant at conventional levels. Second, we assume that the coefficients estimated 
above can be “applied” to the full list of African countries—including those that have never fielded a DHS, 
and were therefore not part of our sample. This assumption seems reasonable given the large number of 
countries that have carried out DHS in Africa—see Table 1. Third, we assume that a given change in per 
capita GDP will on average have the same effect on infant mortality in 2009 as it has in the past. There is 
obviously no way to test this assumption. Conceivably, the fact that the crisis is global (unlike the trend 
deviations in per capita GDP that form the basis for the calculations in the tables in the paper) could mean 
that the impacts of contractions in GDP will be larger—for example, if developed countries are less able or 
willing to provide aid—or smaller—if widespread awareness of the potential consequences of such a crisis 
on mortality prompts African countries or donors to take measures that counteract its effects. 
10 An alternative approach to estimating the growth impacts of the financial crisis compares the World 
Bank’s latest growth projections for 2009 (as of mid-April, 2009) with earlier projections (from 2007) for 
the same calendar year. This approach, as adopted in Chen and Ravallion (2009), yields a smaller growth 
shortfall for Sub-Saharan Africa than the IMF projections used here – a cross-country average contraction 
of 1.7% of GDP in comparison with a 2.5% contraction – and consequently somewhat fewer excess deaths, 
ranging from 16,000 to 23,000 depending on the specification. Because the IMF growth projections are 
more current (at the time of writing) we report the excess deaths based on these figures. 10 
 
  In this note, we use household level data on mortality, national accounts data on past 
shocks, and the most recent IMF projections of future growth to estimate the impact of the current 
global slowdown on infant mortality. Our estimates suggest that there will be on the order of 
30,000 to 50,000 excess deaths in Africa in 2009—deaths that would not have taken place had the 
subprime crisis which began in the United States not spread to African countries. This is a large 
number. Nevertheless, it is substantially smaller than alternative estimates, generally based on 
aggregate (rather than household) data, and with cruder if any controls for household 
characteristics. The increase in infant mortality that can be attributed to the global slowdown is 
also a small fraction of overall infant deaths in Africa: In Africa, approximately 30 million 
children are born, and more than 3 million of them die before they reach their first year of life. 
The bigger tragedy is perhaps not that 30,000 to 50,000 additional children are likely to die in 
Africa in 2009, but rather that so many children die in any given year. 
  Nevertheless, the likely increase in infant mortality presents some important policy 
challenges, as does the fact that the bulk of the additional children who will die is likely to be 
found among poorer households (in rural areas, and those with lower education levels) and is 
concentrated among girls. This note cannot discuss the benefits and limitations of individual 
policies in great detail. However, we briefly mention a handful of policy responses that are 
perhaps important for policy-makers to consider: 
   Policies that limit the extent to which the aggregate GDP shortfalls translate into income 
shortfalls for households: Such policies could include a well-designed public works 
scheme, perhaps with guaranteed employment at low wages (the latter, to ensure self 
targeting), or cash transfers to households in poor areas, areas that appear to have been 
particularly hard-hit by the contraction, or to households with characteristics that are 
correlated with low incomes (for example, low education levels). 
   Policies that limit the extent to which the contraction in aggregate GDP leads to a 
decline in the quantity or the quality of critical health services—such as prenatal and 
post-natal check-ups for women, attended birth deliveries, and growth monitoring for 
children. Paxson and Schady (2005) show that, in Peru, public health expenditures fell by 
more than 50 percent during the crisis of the late 1980s, and that the utilization of critical 
health services by households also declined. Ferreira and Schady (2009) show that, by 
contrast, in Indonesia there was a much smaller contraction in public expenditures in 
1997-98, and that this contraction was made up by increases donor assistance; they argue 11 
 
that this may explain, in part, why infant mortality appears to have spiked much more 
sharply in Peru than in Indonesia. 
   Interventions targeted at girls: The fact that, in crises past, increases in infant mortality 
have been almost exclusively concentrated among girls presents a serious challenge to 
policy-makers in the region. We do not have a good understanding of the mechanisms 
whereby aggregate economic contractions translate into more deaths for girls, but not 
boys in Africa—a critical element to designing effective policies (although selection into 
birth does not appear to be an important part of the story). Nonetheless, policies that 
ensure that girls receive sufficient food and critical services are worth considering; 
conditional cash transfers that focus on conditions for girls may also be effective. More 
broadly, it is important to track inputs and outcomes at the household and provider level, 
and to disaggregate the findings by gender. 
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Table 1. List of DHS datasets used in the analysis, including information on country, 
year of survey, number of mothers, and number of births 
          
Country   Survey Years  Total Mothers 
Total 
Births 
Benin 1996,  2001  7515 18891 
Burkina Faso  1993, 1999, 2003  16362 39410 
Burundi 1987  2416 6464 
Central African Republic  1995  3373 7962 
Cameroon 1991,  1998,  2004  11444 27350 
Chad 1997  4655 11829 
Comoros 1996  1405 3838 
Cote d'Ivoire  1994, 1999  6660 15993 
Ethiopia 2000  8436 20484 
Gabon 2001  3371 7084 
Ghana  1988, 1994, 1999, 2003  11841 25675 
Guinea 1999  4549 11224 
Kenya  1989, 1993, 1998, 2003  18457 44289 
Liberia 1986  3419 8669 
Madagascar 1992,  1997  7592 19195 
Malawi 1992,  2000  11368 27292 
Mali 1987,  1996,  2001  17915 47710 
Mozambique 1997  5535 12468 
Namibia 1992,  2000  6674 13550 
Niger 1992,  1998  9468 26714 
Nigeria 1990,  1999,  2003  14333 36543 
Rwanda 1992,  2000  9317 23607 
Senegal 1986,  1993,  1997  11881 30636 
South Africa  1998  6017 9970 
Sudan   1990  4242 11314 
Tanzania 1992,  1996,  1999 12826 29743 
Togo 1988,  1998  7611 18582 
Uganda 1989,  1995,  2001  11883 30062 
Zambia 1992,  1997,  2002  13776 32044 
Zimbabwe 1989,  1994,  1999  9346 19913 




Table 2. Past growth and 2009 projected growth in Sub-Saharan African nations 
Country 
Average Growth 
1993-2008 2008  Growth 
IMF 2009 
projections Growth  shortfall 
SubSaharan Africa 3.9  4.9  2.5 -2.4 
Angola 8.1  14.3  -3.6  -17.9 
Benin 4.5  4.9  3.8  -1.1 
Botswana 5.6  3.0  -10.4  -13.4 
Burkina Faso  4.8  4.1  3.5  -0.6 
Burundi 0.4  4.4  3.5  -0.9 
Cameroon 3.1  3.9  2.4  -1.5 
Cape Verde  6.1  6.7  2.5  -4.2 
Central African Republic  2.0  3.4  2.4  -1.0 
Chad  5.5 1.6 2.8 1.2 
Comoros  1.5 0.6 0.8 0.2 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.3  8.7  2.7  -6.0 
Congo,  Rep.  2.8 9.1 9.5 0.4 
Cote d Ivoire  1.8  2.7  3.7  1.0 
Djibouti* 3.9  4.9  2.5  -2.4 
Equatorial Guinea  30.0  8.1  -5.4  -13.5 
Eritrea 4.2  1.2  1.1  -0.1 
Ethiopia 7.0  10.8  6.5  -4.3 
Gabon 2.1  3.0  0.7  -2.3 
Gambia, The  4.1  5.3  4.0  -1.3 
Ghana 4.9  6.4  4.5  -1.9 
Guinea 3.6  3.0  2.6  -0.4 
Guinea-Bissau 1.3  2.9  1.9  -1.0 
Kenya  3.2 2.4 3.0 0.6 
Lesotho 3.6  4.1  0.6  -3.5 
Liberia*  3.9 4.9 4.9 0.0 
Madagascar 3.4  6.8  -0.2  -7.0 
Malawi 3.9  7.0  6.9  -0.1 
Mali 4.8  5.0  3.9  -1.1 
Mauritania  3.9 2.1 2.3 0.2 
Mauritius 4.7  5.0  2.1  -2.9 
Mozambique 7.5  6.5  4.3  -2.2 
Namibia 3.9  2.7  -0.7  -3.4 
Niger 3.6  4.9  3.0  -1.9 
Nigeria 4.4  6.1  2.9  -3.2 
Rwanda 5.0  8.4  5.6  -2.8 
Senegal 3.9  4.5  3.1  -1.4 
Sierra Leone  4.0  5.8  4.5  -1.3 
South Africa  3.4  3.1  -0.3  -3.4 
Sudan 6.4  6.1  4.0  -2.1 
Swaziland 2.3  2.2  0.5  -1.7 
Tanzania 5.1  7.2  5.0  -2.2 
Togo  3.0 0.8 1.7 0.9 
Uganda 6.6  6.9  6.2  -0.7 
Zambia 3.2  5.5  4.0  -1.5 
Zimbabwe -1.7  -4.9  2.5  7.4 
Note: where missing (Djibouti, Liberia, 3rd column Eritrea, 4th column Zimbabwe) missing value replaced with SSA average 15 
 
Table 3. Estimates of relation between IMR and GDP for Sub-Saharan Africa, by various trend 
accountings 
      
Dependent 
variable  Linear Quadratic Cubic 
 
 
   Unadjusted   
IMR -33.73  -46.07  -47.67   
  [16.70]* [15.95]*** [22.05]**   
   Unadjusted, restricted to mothers with multiple births   
IMR -38.68  -41.91  -46.38   
  [17.74]** [15.17]*** [25.77]*   
   Mothers' fixed effects   
IMR -42.93  -39.54  -34.76   
   [18.79]** [18.07]** [25.87]   
      
Note: Number of observed births equals 613,468 in panel, 532,419 in bottom two panels. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the country level - there are30 countries. GDP is measured in year 2000 international 






   
Table 4. Estimates of relation between IMR and GDP by 
child or mother characteristics, quadratic trend 
       
Dependent 
variable  Characteristics 
   Boy Girl 
IMR -32.91  -61.94 
 [25.03]  [25.72]** 
    
Mean IMR  113.68  100.35 
N 310265 303203 
   Urban Rural 
IMR -29.70  -53.45 
 [25.77]  [23.32]** 
    
Mean IMR  83.24  116.36 
N 171649 441819 
   Primary or greater  Less than primary 
IMR -28.67  -51.24 
 [21.44]  [26.95]* 
    
Mean IMR  71.58  119.93 
N 162881 450587 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level - there are30 
countries. GDP is measured in year 2000 international (PPP) dollars. 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 16 
 
 
Table 5. Heterogeneity in IMR and GDP relation by size of GDP deviation from cubic 
trends, by gender 
  Boys Girls 
  <= 0 >  0 <=  0 >  0 
Knot at zero  -24.47 -39.80  -90.25  -24.80 
  [26.39] [40.75]  [29.32]***  [36.96] 
  <= -1 sd  > -1 sd  <= -1 sd  > -1 sd 
Knot at -1 s.d.  -14.21 -36.47  -172.68  -28.30 
  [29.11] [29.74]*  [46.64]***  [28.32] 
  <= -1.5 sd  > -1.5 sd  <= -1.5 sd  > -1.5 sd 
Knot at -1.5 s.d.  -4.16 -35.46  -214.12  -38.14 
  [26.87] [27.73]  [56.93]***  [25.69] 
Note: Slope coefficients are estimated from a continuous spline specification. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the country level. GDP is measured in year 2000 international (PPP) dollars.* p<.10, ** 




Table 6. Summary estimates of excess infant deaths as a result of the economic crisis, by 
various growth forecasts and impact specifications 











Difference between 2009 IMF growth 
projections and 2008 growth  28472 38888 40229 39140 29334 49370 
Posited 6% decline in projected growth  60719  82933  85913  83491  62573  165901 
Posited 10% decline in projected growth  101198  138221  143022  143022  139151  321746 
 
 
  